


Characterising Computational Creativity

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- Aims
 - ▶ to motivate the scientific study of creative behaviour
 - ▶ to give a framework within which to consider the rest of the course
- Contents
 - ▶ Some computational creativity
 - ▶ Background – Boden's model of creativity
 - ▶ Formalising exploratory creativity
 - ▶ The relationship between exploratory and transformational creativity
 - ▶ Classifying the failure to be creative
 - ▶ Motivating transformational creativity

- Creativity is one of the things that makes humans human
- If we are to understand ourselves, we need to understand creativity, both as a cognitive and a social phenomenon
- Enabling computers to create will
 - ▶ make them more useful
 - ▶ help us to understand ourselves

- For the past five decades, we have been engaged in the study of Artificial Intelligence (AI)
- Weak AI aims to study and simulate behaviours which, in humans, are called intelligent
- Strong AI aims to create intelligence itself

- For many computer scientists, (even weak) AI is anathema
 - ▶ sometimes because it involves formally incomplete and/or unsound approaches
 - ▶ sometimes because intelligent behaviour is “just too human” to be copied or created by machine
- Nevertheless, AI technology is to be found working in many practical scientific and commercial computer systems

- And many staunch believers in (at least weak) AI do not believe in the simulation of creativity
- When I have asked such people why computers cannot be creative, the only answer has been “because they just can’t!”

- In other words, creativity seems to be too close to the nature of humanity even for some AI-believers
- Computational Creativity is to AI-people what AI is to CS-people!

- Perhaps this is simply a matter of definition: “creativity =def something done by humans”
- But if we look at what seems to constitute creativity in humans (viz. novelty and value in context) there is no apparent a priori reason why a computer cannot be creative

Double standards?

- So it seems that we are aiming at a moving target when we use the word “creative”
- In particular, both value and novelty are relative concepts, relative to
 - ▶ the creator
 - ▶ the observer
 - ▶ the context


So what are we doing?

- My preferred definition of our field is (Wiggins, 2006):
 - ▶ “The support, study and simulation, by computational means, of behaviours which would be deemed creative if exhibited by a human”
 - © NB this does not imply that creativity is limited to things that can be done by a human!
- Updated by Colton and Wiggins (2012):
 - ▶ “The philosophy, science and engineering of computational systems which, by taking on particular responsibilities, exhibit behaviours that unbiased observers would deem to be creative.”

- Margaret Boden was the first artificial intelligence (AI) researcher to approach creativity seriously
 - ▶ in *Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man*, Boden, 1977
- Her 1990 book, *The Creative Mind*, outlines a broad characterisation of creative behaviour
- However, the characterisation is rather vague, since the discussion is more philosophical than scientific
- The aim here is to cast Boden's characterisation in more precise terms

The conceptual space

- Creative activity is cast as the discovery of *concepts* in a *conceptual space*
- The conceptual space contains all the possible concepts available to the creative agent
- The space is defined/constrained by rules
- *Exploratory creativity* is defined as the action of searching the conceptual space for a new concept
- This is an *abstraction* - no strong claim that it works this way in minds/



- An alternative kind of Boden creativity is *transformational creativity*
- This is where the rules defining the conceptual space are changed so as to create a different (but presumably related) space
- Boden suggests that transformational creativity is more significant than exploratory creativity, because it is in a sense “bigger thinking”
- Bundy (1998) and Wiggins (2006b) argue against this, as an overly simple definition

- “A symbolic system cannot create new concepts”
 - ▶ weighted semantic networks allow us freely to define new concepts in terms of old ones
 - ▶ conceptual blending allows us to create new semantic structures directly
 - ▶ geometrical representations of meaning allow arbitrary interpolation between concepts (e.g., Gärdenfors, 2000)
 - ◎ though we do need to think carefully about what the resulting representations mean!!

- “A system which is exploring a search space defined by a representation is not being creative”
 - ▶ not necessarily true: it depends on the expressive power of the representation
 - ▶ creating an artefact by *explicit mechanistic inference* doesn't make doing so any less creative
 - ▶ cognitively speaking, creative insight does not “feel” like enumeration
 - ◎ but such introspection is almost always misleading

- “Non-symbolic systems generalise via a simple mathematical process, which is not creative”
 - ▶ There is no evidence that the human mind does not create in this way
 - ▶ There are suggestions (e.g., Kanerva’s sparse distributed memory) that this is exactly how the human mind creates
 - ▶ Anyway, interpolation and generalisation may be a perfectly good model of creativity

- Let us represent the conceptual space as a multidimensional (possibly metric) space
- Partial and complete concepts are represented as points in the space
- Each dimension of the space represents a feature of the domain
- (So each point denotes a set of property/value pairs)

- Suppose now that we have a set of rules, R , which defines a conceptual space, C
- The existence of transformational creativity implies that there must be a larger set, U , containing C
- So R is a set of rules which picks the elements of C from U
- $C \subset U$

- In order to give our rules, R , we need a language, L , and an interpreter for it
- Let $[[\cdot]]$ be an interpreter which maps its argument (a set of rules in L) to an effective procedure for selecting elements of U
- $C = [[R]](U)$
- We also need a null concept, T

- Let us also allow another set of rules, T , describing our creative agent's method for exploring C
- One more ingredient of Boden's model remains: it is necessary to be able to choose the better concepts from the less good ones
- We introduce a set of rules, E , written in L , which may be used to accept or reject concepts in terms of their quality
- We will need a more complex interpreter, $\langle\langle\cdot,\cdot,\cdot\rangle\rangle$, which, given three sets of rules in L , will return an effective procedure for computing an ordered set of (partial) concepts, c_{out} , from another, c_{in}

$$c_{out} = \langle\langle R, T, E \rangle\rangle(c_{in})$$

- It will be useful to add the operator \diamond which will allow us to compute the set defined by repeated applications of a function

$$F^\diamond(X) = \bigcup_{n=0, \infty} F^n(X)$$

- We can now define the enumeration of the conceptual space, C , by our creative agent:

$$e_C = \langle\langle R, T, E \rangle\rangle^\diamond(\{T\})$$

- Note that e_C may be a subset of C
- This is because a creative agent's exploratory technique, as captured by T , need not be strong enough to discover all the concepts which are actually admissible under R
- Or e_C may intersect C , producing some acceptable and some unacceptable concepts

- We are now able to describe an exploratory creative system with the following septuplet:

$\langle \mathbf{U}, \mathbf{L}, [\cdot], \langle \dots \rangle, \mathbf{R}, \mathbf{T}, \mathbf{E} \rangle$

U	The universe of all concepts
L	A language for expressing rules and concepts
[·]	A testing interpreter (for R)
⟨...⟩	An enumerating interpreter (for R , T and E)
R	A set of rules defining a conceptual space, C , in U
T	A set of rules allowing traversal of U (around C)
E	A set of rules evaluating concepts found using ⟨...⟩

- Boden describes *transformational creativity* as changing the rules, **R**, which define the conceptual space
- In our formulation, there are two sets of rules which can be transformed
- Transforming **R** is transforming what is allowed as the output of the creativity process
- Transforming **T** is transforming the creative agent's personal method

- There is a search space of rule sets, which is itself a conceptual space
- That search space is the power set of the language, $L: L^*$
- So L^* is now the universe in which we are searching
- We can describe L (and L^*) with a metalanguage L_L

- To capture the exploration of the rule space, we need some constraints on what is syntactically well-formed, R_L
- We also need to define the search strategy, T_L
- If we use the metalanguage L_L as before for these specifications, we can use the same interpreters as before, $[[.]]$ and $\langle\langle.,.,.\rangle\rangle$

- The only thing outstanding is the evaluation of the transformation, which can be done with a set of rules, E_L
- We now have another *exploratory* septuple:

$$\langle L^*, L_L, [\cdot], \langle \dots \rangle, R_L, T_L, E_L \rangle$$

- So transformational creativity is exploratory creativity at the meta-level of conceptual spaces
- E_L may be characterised in terms of E (see Wiggins, 2006a, for how)

On failing to create...

- We are now in a position to examine the behaviour of creative systems
- The different components of the descriptions interact, and how they interact can tell us useful information
- Now, we discuss ways in which a system can fail to create
- Therefore, a creative system can introspect about how to improve itself

- *Uninspiration* is the inability to produce valued outputs
- There are three kinds of uninspiration:
 - ▶ Hopeless
 - ▶ Conceptual
 - ▶ Generative
- It is useful to know about uninspiration, because it can act as
 - ▶ a “well-formedness” check
 - ▶ a trigger to transform a creative system in one way or another

- The simplest case of uninspiration is where there are no valued concepts in the universe:

$$[[E]](U) = \emptyset$$

- This means that no creative agent in this universe can ever produce anything valued
- It is a property which we should attempt to disprove of any creative system, *a priori*

- *Conceptual uninspiration* is where there are no valued concepts in a given conceptual space:

$$\llbracket \mathbf{E} \rrbracket (\mathbf{C}) = \llbracket \mathbf{E} \rrbracket (\llbracket \mathbf{R} \rrbracket (\mathbf{U})) = \emptyset$$

- This means that no creative agent exploring this conceptual space can ever produce anything valued
- It is a property which we should attempt to disprove of any exploratory-creative system, *a priori*
- Conceptual uninspiration can be used as a cue to encourage *aberrant* behaviour

- *Generative uninspiration* is where a creative agent's technique, T , causes it to miss the valued members of the conceptual space:

$$\llbracket E \rrbracket(\langle\langle R, T, E \rangle\rangle \diamond (\{T\})) = \emptyset$$

- This means that the agent will never produce anything valued
- It is a property which we should attempt to disprove of any exploratory-creative system, *a priori*
- It can act as a trigger for transformation of T (or R)

- *Aberration* is the production of new concepts which are not in the existing conceptual space (that is, deviation from the expected)
- There are three kinds of aberration:
 - ▶ Perfect
 - ▶ Productive
 - ▶ Pointless

- Aberration happens when a creative agent finds concepts which are valued, but which are not in the conceptual space
- This is why value (E) needs to be represented distinctly from acceptability (R)
- In the CSF, this means that

$$\langle\langle R, T, E \rangle\rangle^{\diamond}(\{T\}) \setminus \llbracket R \rrbracket(U) \neq \emptyset$$

- Perfect aberration is the case where

$$\langle\langle R, T, E \rangle\rangle^{\diamond}(\{T\}) \setminus \llbracket R \rrbracket(U) = \llbracket E \rrbracket(\langle\langle R, T, E \rangle\rangle^{\diamond}(\{T\}) \setminus \llbracket R \rrbracket(U))$$

that is, where all the aberrant concepts are valued

- This, in most cases, will be a cue to transform R so that it includes the new concepts

- Productive aberration is the case when

$$\llbracket E \rrbracket(\langle R, T, E \rangle \diamond (\{T\}) \setminus \llbracket R \rrbracket(U)) \neq \emptyset$$

that is, where some aberrant concepts are valued

- This, in many cases, may be a cue to transform R or T or both

- Pointless aberration is characterised by

$$\llbracket \mathbf{E} \rrbracket(\langle \mathbf{R}, \mathbf{T}, \mathbf{E} \rangle \diamond (\{\mathbf{T}\}) \setminus \llbracket \mathbf{R} \rrbracket(\mathbf{U})) = \emptyset$$

that is, where no aberrant concepts are valued

- This is a cue to transform \mathbf{T} but not \mathbf{R}

- These ideas pave the way towards creative agents which can reason about their own performance, in terms of both value and productivity
- In particular, these analyses, which were not possible in Boden's original framework, allow a system which is essentially exploratory to cue occasional transformational behaviour
- Is this what artists/musicians/scientists do when they (eg) consciously change style?
- Just because we can use the CSF to model creative systems, it doesn't mean that all creative systems have to work by search
- We can usefully conceptualise/model a process as a search mechanism in the abstract *even if that is not how it actually works*

An important question

- What is the difference between Good Old-Fashioned AI Search and Computational Creativity based on the Boden/Wiggins model?

- Given an agenda S (a sequence of states):
 1. If $\text{head}(S)$ is a solution, stop.
 2. Remove $\text{head}(S)$ from S giving remainder S'
 3. $\text{expand}(\text{head}(S))$ giving S''
 4. $\text{merge}(S'', S')$ giving (new) S
 5. Repeat from 1
- For Depth-First Search, $\text{merge} = \text{prepend}$
- For Breadth-First Search, $\text{merge} = \text{append}$
- For Best-First Search, Hill-climbing, A, A^* , $\text{merge} = \text{append} + \text{sort}$

- Key Features:
 - ▶ Representation: can represent all and only output configurations of problem (closed world)
 - ▶ Solution detector: Boolean test for (a representation of) a solution
 - ▶ Heuristics allow control of search for best one(s)
 - ◎ calculate “quality” of solutions
 - ◎ calculate “distance” from nearest solution
 - ◎ combination of these

- GOFAI search vs. CSF
 - ▶ Representation syntax \approx Rules of R
 - ▶ Search space \approx Conceptual space
 - ▶ Algorithmic framework \approx Algorithmic framework
 - ▶ Heuristics \approx Traversal (T) and/or Value (E) Rules
 - ▶ Agenda (S) \approx Current expansion of space (c_{in})

- Representation: closed vs. open world (**C** vs **U**)
 - ▶ admits “discovery” of solutions not envisaged by system designer
- Algorithmic framework: single vs. multiple operands
 - ▶ admits more complex (powerful?) search algorithms, e.g., GA, blending

- GOFAI search can be implemented in the CSF
- The CSF cannot be implemented as GOFAI search
 - ▶ (unless, in both cases, we disingenuously jump to a meta-level)
 - ▶ The CSF is therefore more expressive than the GOFAI search framework
 - ▶ So Boden's notion of creativity is not "just AI search"

- Introduced Creative Systems Framework
 - ▶ Conceptual Space and Rule Set R
 - ▶ Traversal of Space to find Concepts and Rule Set T
 - ▶ Evaluation and Rule Set E
- Transformational Creativity is Exploratory Creativity at the meta-level
- The CSF is more expressive than the standard search framework of AI
- We can use the CSF to help conceptualise creative systems